

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS

PNE MESSAGE NUMBER FORTY-SIX

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM OF STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STOESSEL
AT PLENARY SESSION, NOVEMBER 5: QUOTE:

GOOD MORNING, MR. MINISTER.

(FOLLOWING MOROKHOV PRESENTATION)

TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND TO YOUR REQUEST FOR
COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS ON THE INTERESTING AND USEFUL
PRESENTATIONS MADE BY YOUR DELEGATION YESTERDAY. AS
YOU WILL RECALL, ON FRIDAY WE OUTLINED YOUR PROPOSAL
FOR A 100 KT LIMIT ON THE MAXIMUM AGGREGATE YIELD OF
CONTAINED PNES, AND STATED THAT SUCH A PROVISION WOULD
BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THRESHOLD LEVEL OF THE TREATY
OF JULY 3, 1974. IN YOUR STATEMENT YESTERDAY, YOU
QUESTIONED SUCH AN ASSOCIATION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT
WOULD RESULT IN ELIMINATION OF CONTAINED PNES WHEN WE
EVENTUALLY ACHIEVE A COMPLETE PROHIBITION ON
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. IT IS NECESSARY TO RECOGNIZE
THAT THERE IS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VERIFICATION
PROCEDURES AND THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE WEAPON TEST

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THRESHOLD. THIS FACT WAS IMPLICIT IN DR. SAFRONOV'S

PRESENTATION, IN WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER PNE YIELD COULD BE CONFIDENTLY ASSESSED AS BEING ABOVE OR BELOW THE WEAPON TEST THRESHOLD.

IN HIS PRESENTATION YESTERDAY, DR. RODIONOV MENTIONED SEVERAL APPLICATIONS FOR CT TAINED PNES THAT WOULD INVOLVE EXPLOSIVE YIELDS ABOVE OUR PROPOSED 100 KT LIMIT. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, THAT THESE APPLICATIONS ARE STILL IN AN EARLY STAGE OF RESEARCH AND ARE AT LEAST A DECADE AWAY FROM PRACTICAL UTILIZATION. THIS SUGGESTS THAT WE DO NOT HAVE TO EXPLICITLY INCLUDE THESE HIGH-YIELD PNES IN A PNE AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME BUT COULD SIMPLY PROVIDE FOR A PERIODIC REVIEW SIMILAR TO THAT IN ARTICLE V OF THE TTBT.

ALSO, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES SET FORTH BY DR. SAFRONOV YESTERDAY.

WITH REGARD TO HIS FIRST POINT, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ALONE WERE SUFFICIENT BUT SIMPLY THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS COULD BE USED AT ALL PNE YEILD LEVELS AND WOULD NOT BE INTERFERED WITH BY EITHER PARTY, AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE II OF THE TTBT.

HIS SECOND POINT REFERRED TO THOSE EVENTS FOR WHICH THE INTENDED YIELD IS DESIGNED TO BE BELOW THE THRESHOLD. THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR THESE EVENTS WAS STATED TO BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACT THAT THE YIELD WAS INDEED BELOW THE THRESHOLD. WE DO NOT REGARD THIS AS AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR VERIFICATION FOR THESE EVENTS. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY, IN OUR VIEW, THAT THE CONTROLLING SIDE BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE PEACEFUL PURPOSE OF THESE EXPLOSIONS. THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY
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OF JULY 3, 1974 PROHIBITS NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF DESIGNATED NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST SITES.

ALSO IN DR. SAFRONN'S LIST OF VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACEFUL PURPOSE OF THOSE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WHOSE YIELD WAS ABOVE THE THRESHOLD. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A

NECESSARY ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION FOR ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, NOT JUST THOSE ABOVE THE THRESHOLD. IT IS HOWEVER, NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THOSE EVENTS WHOSE YIELDS ARE ABOVE THE THRESHOLD. THE VERIFICATION PROCEDURE FOR SUCH EVENTS MUST ALSO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT NO WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS PRECULDED OR LIMITED BY THE TTBT ARE OBTAINED.

IN HIS THIRD POINT, DR. SAFRONOV ARGUED THAT THE SIDE CONDUCTING THE PNE SHOULD DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION. OUR VIEW IS QUITE DIFFERENT. WE NEED TO ESTABLISH AGREED SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING ACCESS TO INFORMATION FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES FOR ALL PNES REGARDLESS OF YIELD. IN ADDITION, THE INFORMATION PROVIDED MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.

WITH REGARD TO DR. SAFRONOV'S FOURTH POINT, WE NOTE THAT PNE VERIFICATION WILL NECESSARILY BE MORE COMPLEX THAN THAT ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS TESTS UNDER THE TTBT BECAUSE PNES WILL FREQUENTLY BE USED TO EXPLOIT COMPLEX GEOLOGICAL FORMATIONS AWAY FROM THE CALIBRATED WEAPONS TESTS SITES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE CLEARLY VERIFIED THAT PNES DO NOT PROVIDE WEAPONS-RELATED BENEFITS.

YOU ARE, OF COURSE, CORRECT IN STATING THAT WE HAVE NOT SET BEFORE YOU A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON TREATMENT OF CRATERING OR EXCAVATION PNES.

IN MY STATEMENT YESTERDAY I SUGGESTED THAT WE WORK ON CONTAINED PNES AND EXCAVATION PNES AS SEPARATE CATEGORIES. YOU HAVE OUR PROPOSAL ON SECRET

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CONTAINED PNES. WE HAVE SAID THAT IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION PNES WE NEED MORE INFORMATION FROM YOUR SIDE CONCERNING YOUR INTEREST IN EXCAVATION PNES, INCLUDING YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE MAXIMUM YIELD OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS IN EXCAVATION GRPUPS. I REMIND YOU OF THE QUESTIONS POSED BY DR. ROMNEY CONCERNING GROUP EXPLOSIONS.

FURTHERMORE, IN MY STATEMENT YESTERDAY, I LISTED FOUR UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCAVATION PNES WHICH NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DEVELOPING AN UNDERSTANDING ON EXCAVATION PNES.

THUS, WE HAVE OFFERED A BEGINNING ON DISCUSSION OF THE EXCAVATION CATEGORY OF PNES, AND WE LOOK FOR-

WARD TO FURTHER COMMENTS FROM YOU ON PROPER TREATMENT
OF THIS CATEGORY. WE AGREE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO
DEAL WITH EXCAVATION PENS AS AN ELEMENT OF AN AGREE-
MENT.

IN CONCLUSION, MR. MINISTER, I WANT TO STRESS THAT
THESE COMMENTS ARE OFFERED AS CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS
IN THE SPIRIT OF FRANKNESS AND NEED FOR PROGRESS
WHICH YOU STRESSED IN YOUR CONCLUDING REMARKS
OF YESTERDAY. END QUOTE.
STOESSEL

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